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Abstract: The political settlements framework argues that the distribution of 
organizational power is important for understanding the economic and 
political effects of institutions and policies. Institutions and policies describe 
rules that in turn determine resource allocation, and these can affect different 
types of organizations in very different ways. Organizations can be expected 
to support, resist or distort particular institutions or policies depending on their 
interests and capabilities. The distribution of organizational power can 
therefore determine the institutions and policies that are likely to persist as 
well as the ones most likely to be developmental in that context. This directs 
our attention to the importance of accurately identifying the relative power and 
capabilities of relevant organizations that describe a particular political 
settlement and how these may be changing over time. The articles in African 
Affairs that have used the political settlements framework demonstrate its 
usefulness. In this overview we examine the motivations behind the 
development of the framework and some of the challenges of applying it in 
the context of dynamic interactions between institutions and organizations. 
We also discuss the most appropriate definition of a political settlement, the 
questions the framework is most suited to answer and the challenges ahead for 
developing the framework and its applications. 
 
The political settlements framework emerged to address two important puzzles facing 
the analysis of institutions. First, policies and institutions that worked well in some 
contexts appeared to achieve much poorer results in others. In particular, attempts to 
introduce some of the rule of law and property rights institutions that were effective in 
advanced capitalist countries typically achieved much poorer results in developing 
countries. Moreover, the institutions that worked in some successful developing 
countries appeared to achieve much poorer results in others. Thus, industrial policy 
institutions providing support to export-oriented firms were very successful in South 
Korea in the 1960s but much less so in Pakistan. Secondly, quite different policies and 
institutions appeared to be effective in solving similar problems in different contexts. 
For instance, the public provision of education worked better in some contexts, 
education delivered by NGOs in others. These observations challenged some of the 
initial advances in institutional analysis coming from the New Institutional Economics. 
They suggested that to understand the emergence and relative effectiveness of 
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institutions, we need to go beyond the institutions themselves and look at the social 
context in which the institutions were located.  
The political settlements framework addresses these questions by arguing that the 
way institutions work in practice depends on the responses of the organizations 
operating under these institutions. The relative power and capabilities of organizations 
are therefore important determinants of how institutions work. The distribution of 
organizational power is defined as the political settlement.1 This distribution of power 
across organizations is typically relatively stable and reproduced over time, even 
though incremental and sometimes disruptive changes in the distribution of power can 
take place.  
Political settlements have later been defined in a variety of ways to analyse a range 
of issues. Some of these extensions have been useful, others less so, but overall the 
progress has been very fruitful. I will, however, point out a number of limitations of 
other ways of thinking about political settlements. A number of excellent contributions 
in African Affairs have used variants of the original political settlements framework to 
analyse African development issues.2 Variants of this framework have also been used 
elsewhere to analyse development issues in sub-Saharan Africa and other regions.3 In 
their insightful Research Note in African Affairs reviewing the application of the 
political settlements framework, Pritish Behuria, Lars Buur and Hazel Gray summarize 
the most important features of the original framework and its application in a number 
of articles.4 As their article provides an excellent summary of the most important and 
distinctive features of the framework, I will not repeat what they say. I take a step back 
to look at the motivation behind the development of the framework to help locate the 
importance of some of the differences in usage and applications. I will also look at some 
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of the dynamic aspects of the political settlements framework that are sometimes 
insufficiently stressed in applied work.  
 
 
Institutions, organizations and outcomes  
 
Institutions are defined in the New Institutional Economics as rules that emerge to solve 
particular ‘transaction’ problems. Transactions can broadly describe any social 
interaction, and rules emerge to govern these interactions, usually with the aim of 
achieving better results. This is why we have rules for regulating traffic flows to enable 
faster and safer journeys, rules for organizing firms to clarify who does what, rules for 
making political decisions about taxing and spending, or rules for organizing the many 
transactions involved in making long-term investments. However, it soon became clear 
that the solution to any specific transaction problem depended not only on the specific 
technical problems and the characteristics of the transacting parties, but also on the 
broader social context in which the transaction was embedded. The latter determined, 
amongst other things, the probability that particular rules would be adhered to or 
enforced. However, the social context is complex, and there were soon many debates 
on the ways in which the social context mattered, and the most important characteristics 
of the social context that needed to be captured in an analytical frame to enable 
institutional analysis to be more useful. This was clearly not just an analytical question 
but also one of how to interpret complex historical evidence.5  
The institutional literature began to provide a variety of answers to the growing 
evidence about the confusing effects of institutions. In particular, the literature began 
to look seriously at how cultures, norms and enforcement capabilities of governance 
agencies affected the choice and effectiveness of particular institutions.6 The political 
settlements framework emerged as a critique of approaches that ignored the conflictual 
aspects of institutions and the conflictual nature of the social transformations that 
development entailed. It used historical evidence to argue that the distribution of power 
across organizations affected by particular institutions was usually the most important 
determinant of the path of institutional change, and the effectiveness of particular 
institutions.7 Organizations are groups of individuals who work together in structured 
ways and are subject to the rules of interaction set by institutions in their transactions 
with other individuals or organizations. Organizations have internal rules that define 
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their internal interactions, so there are institutions within organizations. The state is a 
set of organizations that operates under rules that are more or less effective in different 
contexts, and governance agencies like the police or courts are also organizations.  
Significant institutional changes are typically not preceded by cultural or normative 
changes in a society, or autonomous changes in the enforcement capabilities of 
governance agencies. Rather these changes are typically driven by changes in the 
distribution of power across relevant organizations, as a result of new political 
mobilizations, new technologies and economic opportunities, or external shocks. 
Ideologies, leaderships and external conditions can all play an important role in these 
mobilizations, but the sustainability of the institutions that emerge depends on whether 
the changes in the distribution of power required for their effective operation had 
already come about, or could be brought about as a result of ongoing mobilizations. 
The determinants of the fluidity or rigidity of organizational power therefore plays a 
critical role in the political settlements analysis.  
Institutions like property rights, which define rules for making decisions about how 
particular assets can be used, can reduce the transaction costs of coordinating 
productive activities, in the same way as defining traffic rules can make driving easier. 
The problem of achieving an adherence to or enforcement of rules is that rules have 
differential effects on the costs and benefits of different people and organizations 
affected by the rules. Those who become owners of property rights are from then on at 
a permanent advantage compared to those who do not, and even the selection of a traffic 
rule will benefit owners and producers of cars that have their steering wheels on the 
appropriate side. We describe this by saying that institutions create rents, where rents 
are defined as incremental changes in incomes created by particular institutions. 
Policies can be defined as rules that are generally easier to change than institutions, but 
like institutions, they have similar dual effects. They have an effect on economic, social 
or political outcomes, but they also change the distribution of benefits in society. As a 
result of this dual effect of institutions and policies, any analysis of their expected 
economic and political outcomes cannot be taken for granted without looking at the 
responses of the organizations affected by the changes in the allocation of rents. 
Organizations can be expected to respond by seeking to change the allocation of rents, 
and the outcome will depend on a number of factors, including the relative 
organizational and bargaining power of the competing organizations. Institutions that 
threaten the rents of powerful organizations will be strongly contested and may be 
reversed, modified or distorted in different ways.  
 
 
Political settlements  
 
A political settlement (in our definition) is a description of the distribution of power 
across organizations that are relevant for analysing a specific institutional or policy 
problem.8 The distribution of power describes the likelihood of particular organizations 
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‘holding out’ in contests seeking to influence institutional outcomes.9 Powerful 
organizations with greater holding power can outlast competitors in contests, because 
they can either deploy more resources to influence governments or other organizations, 
or inflict greater costs on them, or hold out for longer because they can absorb more 
pain till others give in. Powerful organizations are therefore more likely to win, and 
other organizations are more likely to exit or compromise. Thus, the holding power of 
organizations is not just based on economic capabilities, or on whether they include 
‘elites’ (something that we discuss later) but primarily on their organizational 
capabilities, the capacity of their leadership to mobilize and enthuse, and their skill in 
identifying and rewarding the right people through formal or informal networks. The 
only way to start understanding the distribution of organizational power in a society is 
to look at its history and see how organizations have mobilized, won and lost in the 
past. This assessment is an art, and it requires a deep understanding of the history, 
sociology and ideological and identity cleavages in a country, and how they have 
overlapped with and been used to mobilize around resource issues.  
A distribution of organizational power is a political settlement if it reproduces itself 
over time. This implies a balance between the expectations of different organizations 
based on their assessment of their relative power and what they are getting through the 
political and economic process, which in turn depends on the institutions regulating 
political and economic interactions. Organizations are always mobilizing to change 
rules, reflecting ongoing changes in their relative power and their activities can further 
change their relative power. Organizations therefore exercise agency, but what their 
agency can achieve is limited by the degree of flexibility in the structure of the political 
settlement. Ongoing incremental changes driven by organizations are very possible and 
describe the normal evolution of a political settlement. However, occasionally, there 
may be disruptive changes if some organizations are seriously unhappy with what they 
are getting. This can lead to the use of organizational power in non-incremental ways, 
which can range from radical changes in institutions and policies after important events 
like elections or street demonstrations or even violent conflicts. The characteristics of 
a political settlement can therefore change as a result of sudden non-incremental 
changes in institutions and the associated distribution of benefits, but also as a result of 
long periods of incremental changes. The characteristics of a political settlement can be 
deemed to have changed when changes in institutions and rent allocations result in 
significant changes in economic or political outcomes. Thus, changes in political 
settlements should be associated with changes in specific economic indicators 
associated with institutions, like rates of investment, rates of technical progress, and so 
on, or in levels of political stability or of ‘normal’ levels of violence in that society.  
The political settlements framework suggests that a social system tends towards an 
‘equilibrium’ between the distributions of benefits attributed to particular institutions, 
and the distribution of power across the affected organizations. In advanced capitalist 
countries, this tendency towards equilibrium usually means that formal rules will adapt 
so that benefits are more closely aligned with the distribution of power across 
organizations. Think of the evolution of tax laws in many advanced capitalist countries 
in recent decades as the distribution of power between employers and trade unions have 
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changed. Formal rules are rules enforced by legitimate governance agencies like courts, 
the police and so on. There are many ways in which informality has been defined, but 
for our purposes we define an informal rule as any rule that is not formal. In particular, 
this includes rules that are enforced by informal organizations (like mafias) or even by 
official agencies like the police, if the latter are operating in illegitimate ways. Informal 
organizations are organizations whose internal rules are informal. In developing 
countries where many powerful organizations are informally organized, for instance 
based on patron-client networks, the tendency towards equilibrium may not always 
involve the adaptation of formal rules but could also include informal violations of 
formal rules to capture benefits informally. This aspect of informality is particularly 
important in the political settlements framework.  
The tendency towards an equilibrium does not presume that institutions and the 
distribution of benefits across organizations are ever actually in equilibrium, or even 
that the distribution of power across organizations is static. Indeed, institutional 
evolution happens precisely because societies are never in ‘equilibrium’. It is the 
dynamics of this evolution that we are interested in, and the idea of a tendency towards 
an equilibrium is helpful provided we do not misread this as a movement towards a 
static or determinate equilibrium. That would imply a reductionist framework that 
assumes that societies never changed, or agency did not matter, whereas in fact the 
inspiration behind the political settlements framework is precisely the opposite: to 
better understand dramatic processes of social transformation in developing countries. 
Autonomous changes in organizational power, driven by the agency of leaderships, 
social activists and entrepreneurs are continuously driving the creation of new 
institutions, while these changes in institutions and policies trigger new mobilizations 
by affected organizations that can reverse, modify or more deeply embed these changes. 
This two-way relationship is not determinate or mechanical and the challenge for 
policy-relevant analysis is to identify the most effective ways in which policy can nudge 
the evolution of an evolving social system in positive ways, by better understanding 
these underlying dynamics. 
The existence of a political settlement also does not imply that there is no violence 
in a society, or that the economy is working well. Indeed, the aim of the framework is 
to classify countries in terms of the characteristics of their political settlements, and 
societies differ quite significantly in terms of the degree of internal violence and 
economic performance. All that is required for the existence of a political settlement is 
that the system is able to reproduce, which by definition means that the levels of 
economic performance or political violence are sustainable in that system. Thus, a 
distribution of power can be stable even with quite a lot of violence going on as long as 
formal and informal institutions are allowing powerful organizations to get access to 
enough resources to enable them to continue with their strategies. In terms of this 
framework, for instance, a country like Afghanistan may have an identifiable political 
settlement described by a relatively stable distribution of power across government and 
rebel organizations despite significant ongoing violence. However, this political 
settlement is vulnerable to significant disruptions that could substantially change the 
political settlement if the distribution of power suddenly changes. It is during these 
periods of disruptive change, when levels of violence may be unusually high, that an 
identifiable political settlement disappears. 
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The role of different types of disruptions to political settlements is important to 
understand. Organizational power changes over time, and organizations that were 
strong in the past need not continue to be strong in the next conflict. Moreover, we 
know from game theory that the participants in contests and conflicts are themselves 
unsure of their real holding power and that is why contests and conflicts happen.10 If 
the protagonists had a clear idea of who was going to win in the end, the conflict would 
not happen. However, most of the time, even when different types of conflicts are 
happening, the distribution of power across organizations can be objectively assessed, 
even if the organizations themselves are clearly trying to change this distribution of 
power. The assessment of holding power is therefore both important as it is difficult, 
both for external analysts and the protagonists themselves, and it is particularly 
dangerous to base this assessment on any simple metrics. A plausible assessment has 
to be based on using the best available historical evidence of organizations and their 
past mobilization activities in that country, and tested against contrary opinions coming 
from knowledgeable analysts and practitioners who may have different assessments. 
An acceptable assessment should be aware of alternative views and be able to explain 
why that particular assessment was better.  
Fortunately, we do not need a map of the relative power of all organizations to carry 
out a particular analysis. The relevant organizations could be limited to a village or 
municipality, or they could be national organizations, and in some cases they could 
include global organizations. The specific problems that were initially addressed by the 
political settlements framework, like the differential performance of industrial policy 
across countries facing similar international conditions, could be adequately analysed 
by looking at differences in the relative power of organizations within these countries. 
For other institutional questions, where conflicts between national and supra-national 
organizations may be important, both international institutions and organizations can 
be easily incorporated within the framework. 
 
 
The emergence of institutions  
 
The political settlements framework seeks to provide answers to two related questions. 
What are the institutions that are likely to emerge in different contexts, and how 
effective will particular institutions be for achieving specific economic or political 
objectives? The framework says something about both, but from the policy perspective, 
the second is often the more important question. We consider answers to the first 
question in this section and the second question in the following one. 
The answers to both are more complex than may appear at first sight. The political 
settlements framework is not saying that the emergence of every policy or institution 
reflects the balance of power in a country. Particular changes in policies or institutions 
are the outcome of the agency of governments or other organizations, and are therefore 
not predictable and certainly do not mechanically reflect the distribution of power in a 
society. Governments and organizations exercising agency represent particular 
constituencies, are influenced by their own ideologies, or international pressures and 
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other contingent factors. Sometimes they make huge mistakes in assessing the reaction 
to their activities and end up worse off. A government does not typically represent the 
full balance of interests of all of the powerful organizations in a society. A variety of 
policies and institutions can therefore emerge at different times. The much more 
important dynamic question is whether the institutions and policies that emerge in this 
way will survive and be sustainable, and how they will be implemented, given the 
distribution of power in that society.  
The political settlements framework provides a way of evaluating the sustainability 
of the institutions and policies that emerge, but it does not of course predict the precise 
institutions and policies that actually emerge. Moreover, the evaluation of sustainability 
has important differences with other approaches, including those that use the 
distribution of power to explain the emergence of different types of institutions. 
Secondly, the political settlements framework also provides answers to the question of 
relative institutional performance. This is related to its analysis of the role of informal 
institutions, rule violations and corruption and constitutes the most important 
contribution of the framework to policy analysis.  
The distribution of power is clearly important for explaining which institutions 
emerge and survive. Powerful organizations are likely to block institutions and policies 
that are against their interest, or overturn them later, regardless of their social 
desirability. This obvious point has been made by many researchers including, recently, 
Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson.11 However, Acemoglu and Robinson’s more 
detailed argument is based on a misleading analysis that leads them to conclude that 
inclusive political institutions will, in general, lead to better, more inclusive, economic 
institutions. It is based on an implicit argument about why some organizations are more 
powerful than others, but this argument is not generally true. Their assumption is that 
when political institutions are not sufficiently inclusive (that is, they do not provide 
sufficient democratic rights to excluded organizations to mobilize and access power) a 
few organizations can monopolize power and set up damaging institutions and policies 
like monopolies that benefit themselves but impoverish the rest of society. The 
implication is that if political institutions became more inclusive, the interests hurt by 
damaging institutions would be able to effectively organize to block or overturn these 
institutions. Socially desirable ‘inclusive’ economic institutions would then emerge.  
The critical assumption is that broad-based productive interests are potentially 
powerful but are only prevented from exercising their power by political rules that 
exclude them. The real problem may be much deeper than the absence of particular 
political institutions. In many developing country contexts, organizations that really 
want economic institutions that create a level playing field are either non-existent or 
are very weak for a variety of independent  reasons: there may be very few competitive 
firms that would benefit from a competitive market, many of the most powerful existing 
firms may not yet be sufficiently productive to really want a level playing field that 
deprives them of access to rents, and the relatively poor who are constrained by the 
                                                 
11
 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, 'Political losers as a barrier to economic development', 
American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 90, 2 (2000), pp. 126-30; Daron Acemoglu and 
James A. Robinson, Why nations fail: The origins of power, prosperity and poverty (Profile Books, 
London, 2012). 
This is the accepted version of an article published online by Oxford University Press in African Affairs on 5 
December 2017. Available at:  https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adx044 
Accepted version downloaded from: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/25450/  
 
 
9 
 
privileges of the few may face serious collective action problems because there may be 
too many of them, they may be too poor, or they may have too many diverse interests. 
In these contexts, making political institutions more inclusive by enhancing formal 
rights to mobilize or rights of representation in political decision-making does not 
necessarily mean that productive interests become more powerful. Instead, it could 
further enhance the political influence of already powerful unproductive organizations.  
The sources of organizational power are therefore critical and are not at all discussed 
by Acemoglu and Robinson. Organizational power is not always latent, and waiting to 
be expressed if political institutions would only allow this. Nor is organizational power 
related to the economic resources that groups can mobilize. Holding power is based on 
the capacity to mobilize and organize, using a variety of resources, of which the 
capabilities of mobilizing money is just one. The capacity of some social groups to 
mobilize others using identity politics or ideologies, and the possibilities of using 
identity, ethnic or other cleavages to organize patronage politics and large ‘inclusive’ 
clientelist parties are examples of specific capabilities that determine the types of 
organizations and groups that are most likely to benefit from more inclusive political 
institutions.12 The characteristics of both economic and political organizations are 
therefore critical for understanding how particular institutions will operate.13 All of this 
constitutes the historical ‘data’ about the configuration of organizational power that we 
need to have before we can assess the implications of changing institutions, including 
political institutions, in particular directions. 
In many developing country contexts, the most powerful organizations often have 
interests that constrain broad-based growth. Political parties may want to capture 
resources for their clients in ways that are socially damaging. Productive firms may be 
few in number and have low competitiveness, and they may prefer to ally with 
clientelist politicians to augment their incomes. In these contexts, institutions that 
facilitate greater political inclusion may strengthen these types of organizations by 
making their organizational and influencing activity cheaper and easier. They may also 
enable additional clientelist organizations to emerge, seeking to capture rents for yet 
more constituencies. As a result, reforms making political institutions more inclusive 
may not have a positive effect on economic development in every context. This is not 
an argument for or against democracy or political inclusion, but an argument for 
looking carefully at the structure and capabilities of organizations in a country to assess 
the impact of specific changes in political institutions, even if democracy is justified on 
other grounds.14  
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The analysis of political settlements should also make us wary of arguments in the 
opposite direction. Some developmental state theorists have come close to saying that 
versions of authoritarianism may be helpful or even necessary at early stages of 
development, on the grounds that ‘state autonomy’ can make it much easier to introduce 
policies and institutions that are in the social interest.15 This too is based on a partial set 
of observations and can be equally misleading. Like democracy, authoritarianism 
describes institutions governing the rights of political organizations to mobilize and 
participate in political power. The consequences of authoritarian political institutions 
for development depend, in exactly the same way, on the distribution of organizational 
power and mobilization capabilities. Authoritarianism can potentially deliver 
reasonable outcomes if these institutions are not excessively disrupted and challenged 
by powerful organizations. Authoritarianism can then create incentives for leaders to 
take a long view, and they can end up being developmental in their own interest. 
However if excluded organizations are powerful and can informally challenge and 
distort resource allocations, authoritarianism may achieve poor results. If these 
networks can block or distort the leadership’s resource allocations, they can damage the 
achievement of long-term goals and create incentives for the leadership to join in the 
damaging rent capture as its own second-best strategy. In addition, if an authoritarian 
regime faces internal organizational challenges that are growing in intensity, it is likely 
to become more and more repressive, and any developmental characteristics are likely 
to be rapidly lost with increasing repression. In these cases too, the political settlement 
is increasingly vulnerable. Low-level violence can grow in intensity and the 
institutional structure can collapse with an outbreak of significant violence, often at 
great social cost.16 In all these cases, institutional and policy outcomes can be much 
worse than in the imperfect democratic alternatives.  
The political settlements framework allows us to assess these scenarios, particularly 
in contexts where authoritarian regimes claim that while they may not have inclusive 
political institutions, they are nevertheless developmental, and political inclusion will 
follow.17 Development first and political inclusion later was indeed the trajectory of a 
few successful developmental states (like South Korea), but many other countries failed 
to sustain growth or political stability with authoritarianism, even after a few years of 
successful development. These countries became increasingly repressive and their 
developmental institutional structures ultimately collapsed (like Pakistan in the 1960s 
or the Philippines under Marcos). The political settlements that allowed successful 
developmental authoritarianism in some countries were actually quite special, and a 
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general application of the model to other countries can be just as misguided as the 
attempt to drive inclusive growth by pushing for inclusive political institutions in every 
context. Both types of simplistic responses may have unintended consequences that are 
the reverse of what their advocates may have wanted. The proposed institutional 
changes can result in sudden increases in conflicts, greater repression and worse 
development outcomes. The political settlements framework provides a way of 
analysing the structural and organizational factors that can account for these 
differences. Political institutions are simply rules for determining who exercises power 
and how. But the outcomes of the implementation of these rules cannot be determined 
without a specification of the economic and political organizations in the country, their 
capabilities and relative power, and how they are likely to respond to these rules. 
 
 
The effectiveness of institutions  
 
The second question is possibly even more important. How do organizations influence 
the implementation of specific institutions? Institutions and policies may not be blocked 
or overturned, but their implementation and effectiveness may be seriously affected by 
the activities of powerful organizations. This turns out to be of very great significance, 
particularly in developing countries. In advanced countries, powerful organizations that 
are adversely affected by particular institutions and policies can be expected to pressure 
governments to revisit these rules. In developing countries, however, their response is 
likely to include distortions and corruption that can informally modify the 
implementation of particular institutions or policies in line with their own interests. The 
most important challenge for policy-makers and analysts in developing countries is to 
assess how specific institutions and policies can be designed to achieve particular 
objectives given the high likelihood of such distortions. The political settlements 
framework shows that this design challenge is an important one. 
The issue of institutional distortion and corruption is one of the most important 
contributions of the political settlements framework. At a broad level of generality, the 
framework can explain the significant differences in the institutional characteristics of 
advanced and developing countries. The former are significantly more ‘rule-following’ 
than the latter. The enforcement of ‘good governance’ has proved to be hugely difficult 
in developing countries. Good governance is essentially the enforcement of a rule of 
law by and within legitimate state agencies like parliaments, the police, courts, anti-
corruption agencies, and so on. Advanced countries appear to adhere to a rule of law to 
a much greater extent despite the fact that many developing countries spent a lot of 
resources attempting to improve their enforcement of a rule of law. It is important to 
distinguish between a genuine rule of law, where the enforcers of the rules are also 
subject to the law, and ‘rule by law’ where a strong state enforces rules on weak social 
organizations without being subject to rules itself. There are examples of the latter in 
some developing countries, but a true rule of law only appears to emerge much later.  
The political settlements framework provides a compelling answer to this puzzle. 
Powerful organizations in advanced countries want a rule of law in their own interest 
because they are typically productive organizations that depend on complex contracting 
to generate their wealth. These organizations are also rich and powerful enough to pay 
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for the enforcement of a rule of law and to insist that state organizations should also be 
subject to the law. The emergence of a large number of dispersed organizations that are 
productive and powerful appears to be historically necessary for the emergence of a 
rule of law. In contrast, powerful organizations in developing countries are generally 
not productive organizations that rely on complex market contracting for their 
prosperity. As a result, they typically do not want the enforcement of a generalized rule 
of law. Collusive behaviour provides much higher returns to the powerful in these 
contexts. When there are a few powerful organizations, they can make trust-based 
transactions with each other or rely on informal enforcement to carry out their important 
transactions. Strengthening the capabilities of enforcement agencies is unlikely to make 
a significant difference to the enforcement of a rule of law in this context. The challenge 
for developing countries is how to achieve broad-based development using appropriate 
governance strategies in such contexts till a broad-based distribution of power based on 
productive capabilities emerges. Only at that point is there effective demand for a rule 
of law, and the enforcement of good governance becomes feasible.18  
In countries where a generalized rule of law has not yet emerged, powerful 
organizations are likely to capture rents by distorting the implementation of formal 
institutions and policies or distorting the implementation of rules they see as contrary 
to their interests. Indeed, this is often the only way in which these organizations can 
operate because it is usually impossible to devise formal rules to provide targeted 
benefits to powerful informal organizations. Formal rules have to be transparent and 
therefore at least appear to be in the public interest. It is therefore hard to direct 
resources to powerful clientelist organizations using formal rules. There are exceptions. 
For instance, a history of ethnic or caste deprivation can be used to justify formal 
transfers to particular groups or organizations whose power is based on patron-client 
mobilizations, but these are exceptions. The formal system of caste reservations in India 
is an example. More typically, informal patron-client organizations capture rents for 
their constituencies using informal mechanisms such as the distortion or evasion of 
formal rules.  
For instance, powerful firms in advanced countries may lobby for rules that give 
them access to credit on favourable terms to finance their (usually productive) 
investments. Equivalent firms in developing countries with low productive capabilities 
but with powerful informal networks may prefer to distort formal rules to get loans they 
are not entitled to, or to default on their repayments. Of course, violations of formal 
rules can also happen in advanced countries, but they are less common. This insight can 
help to explain why we see much greater informality in developing countries that takes 
the form of significant deviations between what formal rules say and what happens in 
practice, why formal institutions and rules often appear to be difficult to implement in 
these contexts, and why there is so much overt rule-violating behaviour that manifests 
itself as corruption. All these phenomena are related to a distribution of organizational 
power that works by distorting the implementation of formal rules to bring about a 
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distribution of benefits that more closely reflects the interests of powerful organizations 
that are informal and often with low productive capabilities.  
This leads to the vital policy question: in such contexts, which institutions and 
policies are most likely to promote the achievement of particular social objectives? The 
political settlement analysis is not saying that if institutions can be aligned with the 
interests of powerful organizations, development will necessarily happen. This is 
because powerful organizations in any context want to enrich themselves, not society. 
Developmental outcomes require complex checks and balances to ensure that 
incentives and compulsions work to generate the broadest possible growth in welfare. 
Aligning institutions and policies with the powerful is particularly problematic in 
contexts where powerful organizations have low productive capabilities and are more 
likely to distort formal rules to capture resources. The difficult policy challenge is to 
determine the types of policies that would push low productivity organizations towards 
more productive behaviour in these contexts given our understanding of their 
capabilities and the relative power of the relevant organizations. 
An analysis of rents is one way of digging deeper into this process. Institutions and 
policies that have developmental objectives also create new flows of incomes (rents) 
and disrupt old ones. One way of tracking why developmental objectives may not be 
achieved is to look at how the checks and balances set by other organizations work to 
constrain the organizations that are supposed to deliver with particular institutions. Can 
they ensure that the organizations getting the rents are the ones that are supposed to get 
these rents, and can they be made to actually deliver or achieve what they were 
supposed to? We describe these checks and balances as the ‘rent management’ system. 
The distribution of power across the organizations involved in checking and balancing 
the allocation and use of particular rents can critically affect the outcomes associated 
with specific institutions.19  
For instance, institutions that provide tax revenues to health providers to achieve 
public health objectives may fail if health providers or their internal organizations are 
able to capture these resources without delivering results. Whether they can or cannot 
do this depends on the objectives and relative power of other organizations affected by 
these rent-allocating institutions, such as organizations of patients, the state’s 
monitoring agencies in the health sector, competing health providers, and so on. 
Similarly, institutions or policies can create benefits for some firms through tariffs with 
the objective of helping them to acquire competitiveness through learning-by-doing. 
Can they capture these benefits and live an easy life, or are there checks and balances 
that compel them to use this opportunity to become competitive and allow the state to 
shift support to other sectors and firms? Once again, the answer will depend on the 
configuration of power across a number of different types of organizations. Policies can 
create extra profits for some firms with regulations that restrict market access to 
regulate quality. Is this just a monopoly for providers who deliver poor services or are 
regulators able to ensure that the rents that providers get is justified by safer and higher 
quality services, for instance in taxi rides? Some rents can be subtle, such as the 
incremental gains and losses for organizations as a result of regulations, for instance 
those that limit the use of polluting technologies or which require minimum 
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construction standards. In each case, the social outcome depends on the capabilities and 
activities of relevant organizations that collectively constitute the rent management 
system for that institution.  
Some policies and institutions create rents for explicitly political purposes, rather 
than to achieve economic or developmental objectives. Many redistributive transfers, 
both formal and informal are of this type. While these rents may have economic costs 
as they can deprive productive organizations of resources or create disincentives for 
them, there may also be political benefits in maintaining political stability and averting 
costly conflicts. Not all political rents are therefore necessarily wasteful when these 
political costs and benefits are factored in. However, even here, rent management 
matters. Too much may be redistributed, or to the ‘wrong’ groups, so that the costs are 
higher than benefits. Transfers to some groups rather than others can also trigger 
conflicts that can lead to destabilizing the political settlement. The most useful 
application of the political settlements analysis is to look at these dynamic rent 
management issues to identify the effectiveness of existing institutions and to identify 
alternative ways of managing these rents so that better development outcomes can be 
achieved in that political settlement.  
There are likely to be better institutional alternatives in every context because there 
are potentially many different solutions to particular ‘transaction problems’. In some 
contexts, allocating resources through the public education system can result in the 
employment of too many unqualified teachers because they belong to politically 
powerful networks that capture rents through job creation. The political settlement 
framework can be used to evaluate whether alternative rules for allocating resources for 
education, for instance through NGOs or other organizations, could work relatively 
better in that context. If tariffs to protect infant industries are failing because firms with 
powerful networks are capturing these rents without putting in the effort of raising their 
productivity through learning, the political settlement framework can be used to 
evaluate whether other forms of delivering support to infant industries may induce 
higher effort in learning given the current configuration of organizational power. In 
countries where conventional industrial policy failed to produce good results because 
powerful firms captured rents without delivering results, other ways of incentivizing 
learning, for instance by rewarding foreign companies to transfer organizational 
capabilities to domestic ones, have been hugely successful.20 The political settlements 
framework can explain these differences in institutional outcomes, and why institutions 
and policies need to be designed differently to be effective in specific contexts. This 
type of analysis can clearly have significant implications for effective policy design.  
 
 
Defining political settlements differently and ways forward  
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The political settlements framework discussed above uses a definition that identifies 
macro-political organizational characteristics of societies that are important for 
answering the types of questions discussed earlier. However, other definitions of 
political settlements have emerged and are also widely used. In particular, political 
settlements have sometimes also been defined as common understandings or 
agreements amongst elites, about how resources are distributed and power is exercised. 
This definition was originally presented as being equivalent to the original definition 
of a political settlement as a distribution of organizational power.21 But in fact the two 
definitions are not interchangeable as their analytical underpinnings are quite different. 
The later definition is based on a common sense interpretation of the term political 
settlements, understanding it as an agreement of some sort between elites, particularly 
of a type that emerges at the end of a period of conflict. It has the merit of converting a 
somewhat complex analytical idea into language that a variety of practitioners can 
understand. If the understanding or agreement between elites accurately reflects the 
distribution of organizational power in society, the two definitions can take us to the 
same place. Unfortunately, there is no reason why that should necessarily be the case.  
A further advantage of the elite pact definition is that if we understand a political 
settlement as a ‘pact’ that brings ‘elites’ together, it is possible to see why such an 
agreement may result in conflicts ending, and set the stage for policies being formulated 
that are likely to be implemented. Peace is also plausibly likely to hold if a pact is 
‘inclusive’ in the sense that all relevant elites are included. Defined in this way, there 
is also a similarity between this definition of a political settlement and Acemoglu and 
Robinson’s analysis of inclusive political institutions. Although the arguments are 
somewhat different, the claim here is that a more ‘inclusive’ political settlement is more 
likely to be stable and therefore allow greater development. The elite pact definition 
has become the definition of choice for researchers trying to analyse transitions from 
conflict to peace and the sustainability of a social order.22  
Despite their apparent similarity, the two approaches to political settlements are 
analytically quite different and can potentially give different answers to a range of 
policy questions. While some political settlements in our sense can indeed be 
underpinned by a pact or agreement between elites, this is by no means generally the 
case. What matters in defining a sustainable political economy at the macro level is not 
an explicit, or even an implicit, agreement or pact between elites, but a stable 
distribution of power across organizations. First, the relevant elites in developing 
countries are a problematic category to try and identify without looking at the 
organizations they can mobilize. Many individuals or groups who we may describe as 
elites, like large landlords or educated professionals, may have very little organizational 
power in many contexts. In contrast, many groups that we may not consider to be 
‘elites’, like newly emerging rural or small town political activists, may be able to 
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mobilize huge numbers of supporters through patron-client politics and wield 
considerable holding power. At local levels, powerful organizations can often be quite 
unexpected, for instance poor women organized by NGOs can be a locally powerful 
organization. Focusing on elites rather than formal and informal organizations can 
therefore be very misleading.  
Secondly, even in the special cases where powerful organizations map exactly onto 
groups of elites, the stability of the social order may not require any explicit or implicit 
pact or agreement between them. A stable organizational power structure, which 
defines the political economy in a way that is useful for institutional analysis, is a 
description of a complex outcome of contestation where powerful organizations accept 
the rents they receive as the best that is feasible, without disruptive mobilizations that 
attempt to change the distribution of power. There may be no overt pact or agreement 
at all. Even in advanced countries, ‘elites’ belonging to different parties or classes may 
be involved in intense and apparently no-holds-barred competition, without any 
implicit pact about how to govern or share rents, and yet the overall distribution of 
organizational power may be quite stable because no group can change this distribution 
of power. Conversely, overt pacts and agreements can break down almost instantly, as 
they so frequently do in war-to-peace transitions, if the mobilization capabilities of the 
warring organizations change as a result of their organizational activities.  
Therefore, how we define a political settlement matters. Even if we are interested 
only in assessing the sustainability or vulnerability of a social order, a framework that 
focuses on the distribution of organizational power can allow more precise questions to 
be asked about the calculations and expectations of competing organizations. This is 
directly relevant for understanding whether the rent-seeking strategies of organizations 
are likely to be incremental or disruptive. In contrast, a framework that looks at the 
inclusiveness of a pact between elites can give misleading answers because it ignores 
the organizational basis of conflicts and the sources of holding power of the different 
parties. Too much inclusion of ‘elite’ organizations that are actually not 
organizationally powerful can be just as unsustainable as too little inclusion of powerful 
organizations. The really important questions are about the sources of power in that 
context and how mobilizations are being organized. This information is vital for 
assessing whether the current distribution of organizational power is likely to change 
in incremental or disruptive ways, and the implications for institutions and policies in 
that context.  
However, we are not just interested in identifying the vulnerability or otherwise of 
a political settlement. We are also interested in an institutional analysis of the 
sustainability or effectiveness of particular institutions and policies. The organizational 
power framework of political settlements comes into its own here. It provides the data 
and analytical categories for a rigorous analysis of institutions, rents and their economic 
and political outcomes. The elite pact framework does not direct us to the information 
required for analysing the effectiveness of particular institutions or policies, or help us 
assess alternative institutions or policies that may work better in that context.  
The elite pact definition of a political settlement should therefore be treated as a 
distinct approach that can provide complementary information, rather than essentially 
the same analytical framework articulated in a different language. The construction of, 
and changes in an elite pact may be useful for tracking aspects of organizational 
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activity, namely the coalition-building activities of elites. This can tangentially have 
important implications for political settlements defined as reproducible structures of 
organizational power. But the two are usually not the same thing.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The articles contained in this virtual issue use the organizational power approach to 
political settlements. They identify how the distribution of power can explain the 
emergence of different types of policies and institutions that may otherwise be hard to 
explain. Some use the framework to analyse why the outcomes of particular institutions 
and policies have been particularly poor. Some have gone into the sources of 
organizational power and offer interesting insights into how holding power has been 
constructed in different contexts.  
This introduction to the virtual issue is intended to remind us of some of the complex 
analytical questions that underpin the framework and the exciting challenges of 
deepening the application of the framework in future work. We need to dig further to 
get a better understanding of the sources of organizational power in different contexts, 
how this has been changing and may change further in those contexts, the mobilizations 
that challenge the overall national political settlement in incremental or disruptive ways 
in different contexts and the implications for policy. Furthermore, we need more 
innovative research on the challenging question of how to design institutions and 
policies to achieve better rent-management results in specific contexts. 
  
